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A CRITICAL REAPPRAISAL OF SOME VOTING POWER PARADOXES 
 







Power indices are meant to assess the power that a voting rule confers a priori to 
each of the decision makers who use it. In order to test and compare them, some 
authors have proposed ‘natural’ postulates that a measure of a priori voting power 
‘should’ satisfy, the violations of which are called ‘voting power paradoxes’. In this paper 
two general measures of factual success and decisiveness based on the voting rule and 
the voters’ behavior, and some of these postulates/paradoxes test each other. As a result 
serious doubts on the discriminating power of most voting power postulates are cast. 
 




Diﬀerent power indices have been proposed to assess the a priori distribution of power
among the voters for a given voting rule. Since the only recently vindicated Penrose
(1946) and the later but much more popular Shapley and Shubik’s (1954) and Banzhaf’s
(1965) indices, some other power indices have been proposed: the Coleman’s (1971, 1986)
indices, the Deegan and Packel’s (1978) index, the Johnston’s (1978) index, and the Holler
and Packel’s (1983) index. There are also to be found in the cooperative game theoretic
literature some solution concepts, as semivalues (Weber (1979), see also Dubey, Neyman
and Weber (1981)) that can be seen as generalizations of the concept of power index when
restricted to simple games (see e.g., Laruelle and Valenciano (2002, 2003a), Carreras,
Freixas and Puente (2003)).
These indices sometimes display undesirable properties, referred to a bit exaggeratedly
as ’paradoxes’ in the literature on power indices, where they have been largely discussed.
Recently, Felsenthal and Machover (1995, 1998) have critically discussed them, dissolving
some of them as trivial, reﬁning the formulation of others, and proposing some new ones.
They consider that, in view of the lack of conclusive arguments from the axiomatic point
of view, some paradoxes (i.e., the violation of some reasonable postulates) can be used
to judge and ﬁlter power indices. This methodology and the distinction between two
notions of power, ’the power to inﬂuence’ (or ’I-power’) and the ’power to share a purse’
(or ’P-power’), lead them to disqualify some power indices as unreasonable.
Brams (1975) was the ﬁrst to point out some ’paradoxical behavior’ of some power
indices. He claims that if two voters decide to form a kind of indissoluble ’bloc’, the power
of the bloc cannot be smaller than the sum of the power of its components. The paradox
of size occurs when this property is not satisﬁed. Felsenthal and Machover (1995) consider
that the paradox of size is not that surprising, and claim that what should be expected
is the power of a bloc to be at least as great as the power of the most powerful of its
component parts. They refer to the violation of this property as the bloc paradox.T h e
paradox of new members (Brams, 1975, and Brams and Aﬀuso, 1976, 1985a, 1985b) occurs
when the addition of a new member to a weighted body increases the power of some of
the old members, despite the fact their share of votes constitute a smaller proportion of
the total number of votes. Felsenthal and Machover (1998) consider that the phenomenon
is not paradoxical, and suggest that what should be expected is that a voter with a veto
right should get at least as much power as any other voter, and refer to this property
as the preference for blocker postulate. Brams (1975) and Kilgour (1974) introduce the
quarrelling paradox, which occurs when it is beneﬁcial (according some power indices) for
voters to quarrel or refuse to vote together. Straﬃn (1982) and Felsenthal and Machover
3(1998) raise some doubts concerning the statement of this paradox: in their view, the
model does not permit to capture this modiﬁcation of the voters’ behavior. Deegan and
Packel (1982) show that in weighted majorities, some indices do not satisfy ’the larger
the weight, the more the power’ principle. They refer to the violation of this principle as
the paradox of weighted voting. This principle is generalized by Felsenthal and Machover
(1995) to arbitrary voting rules as the dominance postulate. Fisher and Schotter (1978),
and Dreyer and Schotter (1980) present the paradox of redistribution. They consider a
weighted majority where weights are redistributed, but keeping identical the total weight
and the quota. The paradox is said to occur when a voter loses weight but increases her or
his voting power according to some power indices. Felsenthal and Machover (1995) argue
that only when a single transfer of weight occurs, it is paradoxical that the receiver’s power
decrease, which they refer to as the donation paradox.T h ebicameral paradox (Felsenthal,
Machover and Zwicker, 1998) occurs when the ranking of power is reversed from one
chamber to a bicameral system. Saari and Sieberg (2000) show that diﬀerent semivalues,
which can be seen as a generalization of the concept of power index, rank voters diﬀerently.
Recently, van Deemen and Rusinowska (2003) test the occurrence of the paradoxes in the
Dutch Parliament.
All the variations of the traditional power index notion alluded in the ﬁrst paragraph,
and which display one or other of these paradoxes, formally take the voting rule as the
only explicit input for the assessment of power. That is to say, traditional power indices
map voting rules, usually modeled as simple games, onto vectors whose coordinates are
interpreted as the ’power’ of the corresponding voter. These power measures leave aside
the voters’ voting behavior and whatever might condition it, as their preferences over the
issues, their interpersonal relations or any contextual information. Consequently, the lack
of basis for a positive or descriptive interpretation of these indices has been pointed out
by some authors, as Garrett and Tsebelis (1999, 2001), because no information about the
voters’ behavior enters the model.
In order to provide a more rich and clear conceptual framework to deal with the
foundations of voting power theory, Laruelle and Valenciano (2003b) summarize the voting
behavior of the voters by a probability distribution over the vote conﬁgurations and include
it as a second independent ingredient in the model. Voting power depends then on two
independent inputs, the voting rule and the voting behavior. The measure of success is
deﬁned as the probability of getting the ﬁnal outcome that one’s wants, and the measure
of decisiveness as the probability of being successful and crucial for it. Most power indices
appear as measures of success or decisiveness for special voting behaviors.
In this paper we carry out a reciprocal test between some of the best-established
4voting power postulates/paradoxes and the general measures of decisiveness and success
introduced in Laruelle and Valenciano (2003b). What is the purpose of testing the be-
havior of these factual measures that take into account the voters’ behavior, against pos-
tulates/paradoxes thought for ap r i o r imeasures of voting power (related to decisiveness)
that ignore the voters’ behavior? As will be shown, this reciprocal test sheds some light
on the meaning of these so-called paradoxes and helps to understand better the concept of
power as decisiveness and the diﬀerences with the notion of success in voting situations.
In particular it shows explicitly how the voters’ behavior inﬂuences their success and de-
cisiveness, and within which limits factual behavior is compatible with the postulates.
Surprisingly enough in spite of the selecting aim of these postulates in order to discard
’bad’ a priori power measures, it turns out that these factual measures never violate some
postulates (as the ’donation’ and ’block’ postulates), while in others no violation occurs
for a wide family of behaviors exhibiting a certain level of symmetry. Moreover, success,
unavoidably intermingled with decisiveness in any pre-conceptual notion of voting power,
behaves even better with respect to some postulates in principle thought of for decisive-
ness. On the other hand, the explicit consideration of behavior in the approach shows the
lack of consistence in the formulation of certain paradoxes/postulates (’quarrel’ paradox
and ’block’ postulates) related to a change of behavior and treated as changes of voting
rule within the limitations of the traditional framework. Finally the coherence of the
alluded general notions of success and decisiveness comes out ratiﬁed by this test, as no
’paradox’ fails to be explained in plain terms consistent with real life experience. In brief
this paper shows that a deeper understanding of what is to be measured and a precise
formulation of it permits to disclose confusion about the expectation of how the measure
should behave.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the basic framework
concerning voting rules, and main classical power indices. In section 3 the measures of
success and decisiveness based on the voting rule and the voting behavior introduced in
Laruelle and Valenciano (2003b) are presented. In section 4 examines the behavior of
the measures of success and decisiveness with respect of some postulates/paradoxes. In
subsection 4.1 deals with the ’dominance paradox’ and the ’preference for blocker paradox’.
4.2 deals with the eﬀect of transferring some weight in weighted majorities from one voter
to another (the ’donation paradox’). 4.3 deals with the ’paradox of quarrelling members’
and the ’bloc paradox’. New ’behavioral’ versions of these paradoxes are also proposed.
4.4 deals with the ’bicameral paradox’. Finally, Section 5 sums up with some concluding
comments.
52V o t i n g r u l e s a n d p o w e r i n d i c e s
Let N = {1,...,n} denote the set of seats.Avote conﬁguration is a conceivable result of a
vote, listing the votes cast from the diﬀerent seats. If we consider only voting rules that
assimilate any vote diﬀerent from ’yes’ to a ’no’1,t h e r ea r e2 n possible vote conﬁgurations,
a n de a c hc o n ﬁguration can be represented by the set of seats from which a ’yes’ vote is cast.
An N-voting rule speciﬁes when a proposal is accepted, and it can be fully represented by
the set of winning vote conﬁgurations, i.e., those that lead to the acceptance of a proposal.
In what follows W denotes the set of winning conﬁgurations representing an N-voting rule.
It is assumed that an N-voting rule satisﬁes: (i) N ∈ W, ∅ / ∈ W, and (ii) For all S,T ⊆ N,
(S ⊆ T and S ∈ W) ⇒ T ∈ W.L e tVRN denote the set of all such N-voting rules2,a n d
for any set A, a will denote its cardinal. We drop i’s brackets in S\{i} or S ∪ {i}.
Some particular voting rules that will be considered later are the following. The
dictatorship of seat i is the voting rule W = {S ⊆ N : i ∈ S}. In this rule the decision
always coincides with voter i’s vote, called the dictator.I n a weighted majority rule, a








wi, is given. After a vote, the proposal is passed if the sum of the
weights of the seats where ’yes’ votes were cast is greater than or equal to the quota. The
voting rule is thus speciﬁed by the quota Q and the vector w =( wi)i∈N




If one can choose between two seats, the seat with larger weight seems better. This idea is
formalized (and generalized) as follows. In voting rule W, seat j (weakly) dominates seat
i (denoted j  W i) if for any conﬁguration of votes S such that i,j / ∈ S,
S ∪ i ∈ W ⇒ S ∪ j ∈ W.
If j strictly dominates i (j  W i), then j is said more desirable than i (Isbell, 1958). In a
voting rule W, seat i is a seat with veto if for any S ∈ W, i ∈ S. Obviously a seat with
veto dominates any other seat.
A power index is a function φ : VRN → Rn, that associates with each voting rule W a
vector whose ith component is interpreted as a measure of the power that the voting rule
W confers to voter i. To evaluate the distribution of power among the voters the two best
1See Freixas and Zwicker (2002) for a more general notion of voting rule that admits vote conﬁgurations
with ’diﬀerent levels of approval’
2As is well-known a voting rule W c a na l s ob er e p r e s e n t e db yt h es i m p l eg a m ev :2
N → R, such that
v(S)=1i fS ∈ W, and v(S)=0i fS/ ∈ W. But we prefer this presentation because strictly speaking the
speciﬁcation of a voting rule does not involve the voters.
6known power indices are the Shapley-Shubik (1954) index and the Banzhaf (1965) index.
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These two power indices are the most distinguished members of the family of semivalues
(see Weber (1979), Einy (1987), and Laruelle and Valenciano (2003a)), which can be
seen as an extensions of the notion of power index. In our setting semivalues are maps
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3 Voting situations, success and decisiveness
In any real world voting situation a group of voters makes decisions by means of a voting
rule. The voting rule is modelled as above, and the voters are labelled by attaching to
each of them the label of the seat she occupies. As to their behavior, as in Laruelle and
Valenciano (2003b), we summarize it by a probability distribution over the set of vote
conﬁgurations: p :2 N → R which associates with each vote conﬁguration S its probability
of occurrence p(S), where 0 ≤ p(S) ≤ 1f o ra n yS ⊆ N, and
 
S⊆N
p(S)=1 . That is, p(S)
gives the probability that voters in S and only them vote ’yes’. Given this distribution of
probability, let γi(p) denotes the probability that voter i votes ’yes’:




and ¯ γi(p) denotes the probability that voter i votes ’no’: ¯ γi(p)=1−γi(p). PN will denote
the set of all maps representing such probability distributions over 2N. This set can be
interpreted as the set of all conceivable voting behaviors of n voters within this setting.
The notion of success and decisiveness are grounded ex post, that is, once a proposal
has been submitted to a vote, the vote conﬁguration has emerged and the ﬁnal outcome
7passage or rejection is known. Once the resulting vote conﬁguration S is known, voter i is
said to have been successful3 if her vote coincides with the decision that has been made.
That is, if
(i ∈ S ∈ W)o r( i/ ∈ S/ ∈ W).
And voter i is said to have been decisive, the basic notion behind several concepts of
’voting power’, if
(i ∈ S ∈ W and S\i/ ∈ W)o r( i/ ∈ S/ ∈ W and S ∪ i ∈ W).
In a voting situation (W,p), ex ante, that is, once voters occupy their seats, but before
voters cast their vote, decisiveness and success can be deﬁned in probabilistic terms:
Deﬁnition 1 (Laruelle and Valenciano, 2003b) For any N-voting rule W ∈VRN and any
probability distribution p ∈ PN over the vote conﬁgurations:
(i) Voter i’s measure of success in voting situation (W,p) is given by







(ii) voter i’s measure of decisiveness in voting situation (W,p) is given by














i (W,p): =P(i is successful & i votes ’yes’), Ω−






i (W,p): =P(i is decisive & i votes ’yes’), and Φ−
i (W,p): =P(i is decisive & i
votes ’no’).
Most well-known power indices are special cases of these general measures. In partic-
ular, the Rae (1969) index (or rather the generalization proposed by Dubey and Shapley
(1979)) is the measure of success for p∗ such that p∗(S)= 1







3The term ’success’ is due to Barry (1980), but these notions can be traced back under diﬀerent names
at least to Rae (1969) (see also Brams and Lake (1978), and Straﬃn, Davis and Brams (1981)).
8The Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index are measures of decisiveness4.M o r e
precisely, for p∗ such that p∗(S)= 1
2n for all S ⊆ N,a n da l lW ∈VRN,
Φi(W,p∗)=Bzi(W),
while for pSh such that pSh(S)= 1
(n+1)(
n
s) for all S ⊆ N,a n da l lW ∈VRN,
Φi(W,pSh)=Shi(W).
Finally, we have the following relation between decisiveness and semivalues:
Proposition 1 For all p ∈ Pn that assign the same probability to any two vote conﬁgu-
rations with the same number of ’yes’ voters, the measure of decisiveness Φ(−,p) becomes
as e m i v a l u e .































and consequently Φ(−,p)i sas e m i v a l u e .
4 Some paradoxes reexamined
In the traditional power indices setting only the simple game describing the voting rule
enters the picture, and consequently all the ’paradoxes’ brieﬂy reviewed in the introduction
were originally stated for ’power indices’ or maps φ :VRN → RN, while now they must be
adequately re-stated in terms of a map Ψ :VRN×PN → RN. This is easily achieved taking
into account that with any such map Ψ and each p ∈ PN, one can associate a map or
4Coleman (1971)’s power to initiate and to prevent action can also be seen as probabilities of being
decisive, while the Deegan and Packel (1978), Johnston (1978) and Holler and Packel (1983) indices cannot.
For details, see Laruelle and Valenciano (2003b).
9’power index’ Ψ(−,p): VRN → RN, which associates with each voting rule W the vector
Ψ(W, p), interpretable as the power proﬁle corresponding to rule W under behavior p. We
will refer to such maps generically as ’power measures’, leaving deliberately unspeciﬁed
the meaning of this ’power’, so that both success and decisiveness (as given by (1) and (2))
are included. Thus, we will say that success (or decisiveness) displays or not such or such
paradox5 for a certain p ∈ PN,i fΩ(−,p)( o rΦ(−,p)) (see Deﬁnition 1) displays it.
4.1 The better the seat, the more the power?
The paradoxes that we consider in this section refer to the conﬂict between the ranking of
voters’ power provided by a measure for a given voting rule and variations of the principle
’the better the seat, the more the power’. For some power measures it may happen that a
voter occupies a ’better’ seat than another but has less power. There are several paradoxes
of this type that result from diﬀerent speciﬁcations of when a seat is considered ’better’
than another. The ﬁrst one concerns weighted majority rules, where it seems clear that
’the larger the weight, the more the power’. Nevertheless not all power measures satisfy
this property. Deegan and Packel (1982) show that their index does not satisfy it, and
refer to this failure as the ’paradox of weighted voting’. According to Felsenthal and
Machover (1995), a valid measure of a priori power should not display this paradox. They
even go further, proposing the ’dominance’ postulate that states that the more desirable
(as deﬁned in section 2) the seat, the more the power ought to be. We will refer to the
violation of this property as the ’dominance paradox’, which can be restated as follows in
our setting:
Dominance paradox: Ap o w e rm e a s u r eΨ :VRN × PN → RN is said to display the
dominance paradox for a given p ∈ PN, if there exists some N-voting rule W,s u c h
that Ψj(W,p) < Ψi(W, p) although j  W i.
A weaker form of the same principle is to require that a ’blocker’ (that is, a seat with
veto) has at least as much power as any other voter. The violation of this property is
referred to by Felsenthal and Machover as the ’preference for blocker paradox’, and can
be reformulated as follows:
Preference for blocker paradox: Ap o w e rm e a s u r eΨ is said to display the preference
for blocker paradox for a given p ∈ PN, if there exists some N-voting rule W,s u c h
that Ψj(W,p) < Ψi(W, p) although j has a veto and i has not.
5We use the term ’paradox,’ common in the voting power literature to refer to the violation of some
property considered desirable for an a priori measure, but we do not attach to it any positive nor negative
value, we just study the conditions and explanation of their occurrence. In fact, the absence of anything
paradoxical in case of their ocurrence in this setting is one of the obvious outcomes of this study.
10Is it reasonable to expect that ’the better the seat, the more the power’ for a measure
of factual power? Now the probabilities of the vote conﬁgurations also matter. Therefore
it may happen that a voter sitting on a more desirable seat has less chances of being
decisive/successful because the distribution of probability over the vote conﬁgurations
more than compensates the voter in the worse seat. The following example illustrates this
intuitively plausible possibility.
Example: In the 4-person voting rule
W = {{1,4},{2,4},{3,4},{1,2,3},{1,2,4},{1,3,4},{2,3,4},{1,2,3,4}},




1/2, if S = {1,2,3} or {4}
0, otherwise,
we obtain Φ4(W,p) < Φi(W,p)a n dΩ4(W, p) < Ωi(W, p), for i =1 ,2,3. This could be a
stylized model for a four parties parliament, with three small left-wing parties (1, 2, and
3) and a large right-wing party 4. The large party has a smaller probability of exerting
power than any of the small parties because these parties have similar (in the example
identical) behaviors, far diﬀerent from the right-wing party’s behavior.
Thus, it is to be expected many violations of the dominance postulate for many behav-
iors. Notwithstanding, the dominance paradox never occurs for distributions of probability
over vote conﬁgurations that exhibit a strong degree of symmetry. Namely, if the proba-
bility of a vote conﬁguration only depends on the number of its ’yes’ voters, that is, when,
according to Proposition 1, Φ(−,p) becomes a semivalue (as is the case, for example, for
the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices), the dominance postulate is preserved. This sets
a limit to the possibility of occurrence of the dominance paradox (and therefore to the
preference for blocker paradox).
Proposition 2 Neither the measure of success (1), nor the measure of decisiveness (2)
display the dominance paradox when the probability of any vote conﬁguration only depends
o nt h en u m b e ro f’ y e s ’ - v o t e r s .
Proof. Let W be a N-voting rule, and i,j ∈ N, s.t., j  W i,t h a ti s ,S∪i ∈ W ⇒ S∪j ∈
W, for any S ⊆ N\{i,j}.T h e r e f o r eS\i/ ∈ W ⇒ S\j/ ∈ W, for any S containing i and j.



































If p(S)=p(T) whenever s = t,w eh a v ep(S ∪ i)=p(S ∪ j) for all S ⊆ N\{i,j}, which
yields Φ+
i (W, p) ≤ Φ+
j (W,p). Similarly for Φ−




































i (W, p) ≤ Φ−
j (W,p). Finally, as Φi(W,p)=Φ+
i (W,p)+Φ−
i (W,p), we also have
Φi(W,p) ≤ Φj(W,p). The proof of Ωj(W,p) ≥ Ωi(W,p) is similar.
Finally, we have a weaker condition limiting the possibility of occurrence of the ’pref-
erence for blocker paradox’ for the success.
Proposition 3 The measure of success (1) does not display the dominance paradox when
for any two voters the probability of voting ’yes’ is the same.
Proof. Let W be a N-voting rule in which j has a veto. Then S ∈ W ⇒ j ∈ S,a n dt h e
probability of a successful negative vote of j equals j’s probability of voting ’no’, that is,
Ω−















Thus, Ωj(W, p) ≥ Ωi(W,p) for all i.
The following example shows how the decisiveness may display the preference for
blocker paradox even if all voters have the same probability of voting ’yes’.
Example: In the 4-person voting rule W = {{1,2,3},{1,2,4},{1,2,3,4}}, voters 1 and
2 have a veto. Suppose that the vote conﬁgurations have the following probabilities:
p(S): =
 
9/32, if S = {1,2} or {3,4}
1/32, otherwise.
A simple calculation shows that Φ1(W, p) < Φ3(W, p). Note that all voters have the same
probability of voting ’yes’: γi(p)=1
2, for i =1 ,..,4.
12In sum the ’paradox of dominance’ is not that paradoxical after all, although it never
occurs when the probability of a vote conﬁguration only depends on its number of ’yes’-
voters, something not to be expected in real-world situations in general, but a condition
which is satisﬁed, for instance, by the family of semivalues. As to the success it does
not display the preference for blocker paradox under even more general conditions, being
enough that all voters have the same probability of voting ’yes’.
4.2 Transferring weight to gain power?
The paradox considered in this section concerns weighted majorities. The principle at
stake is that a voter should not gain power when part or all of her weight is transferred to
another voter. Dreyer and Schotter (1980) consider a weighted majority where weights are
redistributed, but keeping identical the total weight and the quota. They show that it may
happen that a voter loses weight but increases her or his voting power according to some
power indices. They refer to this phenomenon as the ’paradox of redistribution’. But as
Felsenthal and Machover (1995) rightly argue in the context of traditional power indices,
the transfer of weight between two voters will aﬀect the other voters. Therefore if there
is more than one transfer of weight, the fact that a ’donor’ gains power is not paradoxical
because it might be due to the transfers that have occurred among other voters. But if
there is just one transfer between two voters: ’We surely ought to expect that donating
weight may if anything cause a reduction in the donor’s power.’ (Felsenthal and Machover,
1998, p. 215). The violation of this principle is called the ’donation paradox’.
It is worth remarking that strictly speaking, in spite of the term ’donation’ conveying
the idea of a certain behavior on the part of the voters (a voter giving part of her weight to
another voter), the formal statement of this paradox entails just a change of voting rule.
It could not be otherwise in a setting in which the only ingredient is the voting rule!6 In
our setting the question is whether just one such transfer may increase the power of the
’donor’ assuming that the change of rule that does not modify the voters’ voting behavior:
Donation paradox: Ap o w e rm e a s u r eΨ is said to display the donation paradox for a
given p ∈ PN, if there exist two weighted majority rules with the same quota,
6In our setting, in addition to the voting rule, the voters behavior (in probabilistic terms) enters the
picture, thus it is possible a ’behaviorial’ formulation of some paradoxes, as the ’bloc paradox’ considered
in the next subsection, which is a generalization of the particular case of the donation paradox in which
all the weight is transferred from one voter to another.






wi − λ,i fk = i
wj + λ,i fk = j
wk,i fk  = i,j,
(3)
for some 0 < λ ≤ wi, such that
Ψi(W ,p) > Ψi(W,p).
The following result shows that neither success nor decisiveness exhibit this paradox
whatever the voters’ behavior.
Proposition 4 Whatever the voters’ behavior, neither the measure of success, nor the
measure of decisiveness display the donation paradox.
Proof. Let W and W  be two N-weighted majority rules with the same quota, W =
W(Q;w)a n dW  = W(Q;w ), and (3) for some 0 < λ ≤ wi. Then, ω (S)=ω(S) for all
S s.t. i,j ∈ S,a n dω (S)=ω(S) − λ for all S s.t. i ∈ S and j/ ∈ S. Therefore for any















































i (W ,p) ≤ Φ+
i (W,p). The same inequality for Φ−
i is derived similarly, and
as a consequence it also holds for Φi. The proof for Ωi is entirely similar.
4.3 Joining to harm? Quarrelling to help?
The paradoxes considered in this section concern the eﬀect in the voters’ power of the
formation of a ’bloc’, or its opposite, that is, the eﬀect of a ’quarrel’. Brams (1975)
considers weighted rules where two voters decide to form a kind of indissoluble ’bloc’. The
’paradox of size’ occurs when the power of the bloc is strictly smaller than the sum of the
power of its components. Felsenthal and Machover (1998, p. 226) criticize this paradox:
14”The ’conventional wisdom’ that the whole is greater than -or at least equal to- the sum
of its parts is no argument at all but a mere saying”. But in their view, ”There are indeed
very good common-sense arguments suggesting that the power of a bloc ought to be at
least as great as the power of the most powerful of its component parts”. The violation of
this principle is called the ’bloc paradox’.
Again, in spite of the behavioral ﬂavor of the preceding terms and stories, the tradi-
tional setting forces their formalization as a change of voting rule. For any N-voting rule
W, and any two seats i,j ∈ N,t h ef o r m a t i o no fab l o cb yj’s annexation of i,i sm o d e l l e d





B ⇔ S ∪ i ∈ W (for any S containing j),
S ∈ W
i,j
B ⇔ S \ i ∈ W (for any S not containing j).
The ’bloc paradox’ occurs when voter j’s power in the new rule is strictly smaller than
her power in the original rule (as far as i is not a null seat7 in the original rule):
Bloc paradox: Ap o w e rm e a s u r eΨ is said to display the bloc paradox for a given p ∈ PN,
if for some N-voting rule W,s o m ei,j ∈ N, and W
i,j
B as deﬁned above,
Ψj(W
i,j
B ,p) < Ψj(W,p).
A symmetrically opposed situation occurs when two voters ’refuse to join together to
help forming a winning coalition’ (Brams 1975, p. 181): this ought not to beneﬁtt oa n y
of these two voters. The ’paradox of quarrelling members’ occurs when this principle is
not satisﬁed. Felsenthal and Machover (1995) note that the original formulation, which
consists of deleting from the list of winning conﬁgurations those including the quarrelling
members does not always lead to a voting rule. But an alternative formulation, entirely
similar to that of Felsenthal and Machover’s bloc paradox, as a change of voting rule is
possible. Namely, given an N-voting rule W, and any two seats i,j ∈ N (where i is not a






Q ⇔ S \ i ∈ W (for any S containing j),
S ∈ W
i,j
Q ⇔ S ∪ i ∈ W (for any S not containing j).
The ’quarrel paradox’ occurs when voter j’s power in the new rule is strictly larger than
her power in the original rule:
7A ’null seat’ in a voting rule is a seat such that the result of a vote is never inﬂuenced by the vote cast
from that seat. That is, i is a null seat in rule W,i fS ∈ W ⇔ S \ i ∈ W.
15Quarrel paradox: Ap o w e rm e a s u r eΨ is said to display the quarrel paradox for a given
p ∈ PN,i ff o rs o m eN-voting rule W,s o m ei,j ∈ N, and W
i,j
Q as deﬁned above,
Ψj(W
i,j
Q ,p) > Ψj(W,p).
We have the following result:
Proposition 5 Whatever the voters’ behavior, neither the measure of success, nor the
measure of decisiveness display the bloc paradox or the quarrel paradox.
Proof. Let W be an N-voting rule, and i,j ∈ N. Let us consider the case of a bloc W
i,j
B .
For any vote conﬁguration S such that j ∈ S,i fS ∈ W then S ∈ W
i,j
B ,a n di fS\j/ ∈ W
then S\j/ ∈ W
i,j





































B ,p) ≥ Φj(W,p). The same inequality for Ωj is derived similarly.
Finally, the reverse inequalities for Φ and Ω for the case of a quarrel is obtained similarly.
As already commented, in spite of the verbal ’dramatization’ of the formation of a
bloc (or a quarrel) in terms of a change of behavior, the above formulations are the only
feasible in the traditional setting: that is, as changes of voting rule8. But if a voter’s
voting behavior changes so as to always vote with (or against) some other voter, such a
change concerns the voting behavior of the voters, no the voting rule. This is possible in
our setting, if the starting point is a voting situation (W,p) we can keep the voting rule
W unchanged and modify the voting behavior represented by p.
First, consider the case of a ’bloc’. If voter i changes her behavior to vote permanently
as voter j,w ew i l ls a yt h a t’ i switches in favor of j’. Similarly, in the case of ’quarrel’
between i and j,w ew i l ls a y’ i switches against j’ to mean that voter i decides to vote always
opposite to voter j. Thus we consider two similar and opposed changes aﬀecting only voter
i’s behavior, from a previous voting situation described by a probability distribution p.
The changes induced in the distribution of probability when i switches in favor of j are
(i) the probability of any vote conﬁguration where i and j vote opposite becomes zero,
8Similar doubts were already raised by Straﬃn (1982) or Felsenthal and Machover (1998) concerning
the paradox of quarrelling members in its original formulation.
16(ii) the probability of a vote conﬁguration S where i and j both vote ’yes’ is increased by
the previous probability of the vote conﬁguration S \ i, and (iii) the probability of a vote
conﬁguration S where i and j both vote ’no’ is increased by the former probability of the
vote conﬁguration S ∪i.D e n o t i n gp
ij
B the probability distribution resulting from p by the







p(S)+p(S \ i), if i,j ∈ S
p(S)+p(S ∪ i), if i,j / ∈ S
0, otherwise.
In the ’quarrel’ case, when voter ’i switches against j’, the resulting probability distribution
p
ij







p(S)+p(S ∪ i), if j ∈ S and i/ ∈ S
p(S)+p(S \ i), if j/ ∈ S and i ∈ S
0, otherwise.
It seems reasonable to expect that if voter i gives his or her vote to voter j this would
not harm voter j. Similarly, if voter i switches to oppose j’s vote permanently this would
not beneﬁt voter j. The violation of these properties gives rise to the following ’paradoxes’
in terms of our power measures:
Behavioral bloc (i switching in favor of j) paradox: Ap o w e rm e a s u r eΨ is said to
display the behavioral bloc (i switching in favor of j) paradox for a given p ∈ PN,i f
there exists an N-voting rule W, such that for some i,j ∈ N, Ψj(W,p
ij
B) < Ψj(W,p).
Behavioral quarrel (i switching against j) paradox: Ap o w e rm e a s u r eΨ is said to
display the behavioral quarrel (i switching against j) paradox for a given p ∈ PN,i f
there exists an N-voting rule W, such that for some i,j ∈ N, Ψj(W, p
ij
Q) > Ψj(W,p).
The following result, whose simple proof we omit, conﬁrms the intuition for the measure
of success:
Proposition 6 The measure of success never displays the behavioral bloc paradox nor the
behavioral quarrel paradox.
But the result does not hold for the measure of decisiveness. If surprising at ﬁrst sight,
this is not paradoxical as shown by the following reasoning for the behavioral bloc paradox
(similar considerations apply to the quarrel paradox). When voter i switches in favor of
voter j, the change of voting behavior has two opposite eﬀects on j’s decisiveness. On
the one hand, the probability of those winning conﬁgurations S containing i and j (resp.,
17not containing neither i nor j)i nw h i c hj is decisive increases in p(S \i)( r e s p . ,p(S ∪i)),
which increases j’s decisiveness. But on the other hand, the probability of those winning
conﬁgurations S containing j but not i (resp., i but not j)i nw h i c hj is decisive become 0,
which diminishes j’s decisiveness. The net eﬀect is thus uncertain: when the second eﬀect
is more important, we will have the paradox, as illustrated in the following example.
Example: Consider the voting situation given by the 3-person majority rule W =




9/16, if S = {1,3}
1/16, otherwise.






5/8, if S = {1,2,3}
1/8, if S = ∅, {3}, or {1,2}
0, otherwise.
For this voting rule voter 1 is decisive in conﬁgurations {1,2}, {1,3}, {2} and {3}. After
voter 2 joining voter 1, it is easy to check that Φ1(W,p21
B )=1 /4 < 3/4=Φ1(W, p).
The fact that the measure of success and the measure of decisiveness exhibit diﬀerent
properties underline that these are two diﬀerent notions. The diﬀerence has perhaps been
overlooked in the literature, possibly due to the unawareness of the fact that the linear
relationship between these two notions for the particular behavior p∗ (as pointed out by
Dubey and Shapley (1979) for the Banzhaf and Rae indices) does not hold in general. As
a result too little attention has been paid to the measures of success.
4.4 Bicameral paradox?
Felsenthal, Machover and Zwicker (1998) consider a bicameral system, where a bill requires
the approval of two separate chambers to be passed. Let N1 and N2 denote the seats in
either chamber (N1∩N2 = ∅), and let WN1 and WN2 denote the voting rules used by each
chamber. Then a bicameral rule based on these rules is deﬁned by the N-voting rule WN,
with N = N1 ∪ N2,w h e r e
WN = {S ⊆ N : S ∩ N1 ∈ WN1 and S ∩ N2 ∈ WN2}.
They argue that it would be unreasonable that the ranking of power between two
voters were reversed from one chamber to the bicameral system: if one voter has more
18power in one chamber than another voter then she should also be more powerful in the
bicameral system. If this is not so, the index would display the ’bicameral paradox’9.
The formulation of this paradox in our setting must specify the voting behavior for all
the three voting rules. But as N1 and N2 are subsets of N, we are speaking of a single
set of voters. Thus, the voting behavior of N in the bicameral system (pN) speciﬁes in
















pN(S ∪ T) for any S ⊂ N2.
Thus, pN1 and pN2 are fully determined by pN, while the voting rule WN is fully determined
by WN1 and WN2. Note that for any i in chamber k =1 ,2, i. e., for all i ∈ Nk,
γi(pNk)=γi(pN). Then the bicameral paradox can be formulated for our general measures.
Bicameral paradox: Ap o w e rm e a s u r eΨ displays the bicameral paradox for some pN ∈
PN,i ff o rs o m eb i c a m e r a ls y s t e mWN based on WN1 and WN2, the following property
is not satisﬁed for any pair of voters i and j from the ﬁrst chamber:
Ψi(WN1,p N1) < Ψj(WN1,p N1) ⇔ Ψi(WN,p N) < Ψj(WN,p N).
It is easy to provide examples showing that both measures (success and decisiveness)
display this paradox. Is that paradoxical the violation of this property for these factual
measures as happens to be the case? Not really. As an extreme example, consider a bicam-
eral system in which decisions are made by simple majority in both chambers. Imagine
that in the ﬁrst chamber all voters independently toss a coin to vote ’yes’ or ’no’, while
in the second chamber all voters blindly vote as a particular voter from the ﬁrst chamber.
Then, while in the ﬁrst chamber all voters will have identical chances of success and deci-
siveness, in the bicameral system the voter whose vote is always followed by the members
of the second chamber will have more chances than any other from the ﬁrst chamber.
Notwithstanding, it is possible to set a clear limit to the occurrence of this paradox.
Consider a voting situation consisting of a bicameral system in which the voting behavior
of the voters in one chamber is independent from that of voters in the other one, that is,
we have:
pN(R)=pN1(R ∩ N1) pN2(R ∩ N2) for all R ⊆ N.( 4 )
In this case we have the following result:
9A weaker bicameral paradox (or violation of a stronger principle) occurs when the ratio of power
between some two voters is not the same in the bicameral rule and in some of the two chambers.
19Proposition 7 In a bicameral system in which the voting behavior in one chamber is
independent from the behavior in the other, and the probability of passing a decision is not
zero in either chamber:
(i) The measure of decisiveness never displays the bicameral paradox.
(ii) The measure of success does not display the bicameral paradox if, in addition, for
any two voters in the same chamber the probability of voting ’yes’ is the same.
Proof. (i) Let WN be a bicameral system based on WN1 and WN2. Let A(WN2,p N2)d e n o t e
the probability of chamber 2 accepting the proposal (and A(WN2,p N2)=1 −A(WN2,p N2)),
that is




For any voter i, the probability of being decisive in the bicameral system, Φi(WN,p N), is
the probability of i being decisive in the chamber to which the voter belongs and a winning
vote conﬁguration occurring in the other chamber. That is, if i ∈ N1, being the behavior
on either chamber independent from that in the other (i.e., assuming pN ∈ PN satisﬁes
(4)), we have
Φi(WN,p N)=Φi(WN1,p N1) A(WN2,p N2).
Then, as A(WN2,p N2) > 0, the measure of decisiveness will never display the bicameral
paradox.
(ii) Now for the success we have that a voter i will be successful if either she votes
’yes’ and in both cameras the result is approval, or votes ’no’ and at least in one camera
rejection wins. That is, denoting γi(p): =γi(pN)=γi(pN1), if i ∈ N1,
Ωi(WN,p N)=Ω+
i (WN1,p N1) A(WN2,p N2)+Ω−
i (WN1,p N1)
+(γi(p) − Ω−
i (WN1,p N1)) A(WN2,p N2),
where the last summand can be rewritten as
(γi(p) − Ω−
i (WN1,p N1)) A(WN2,p N2)
= γi(p) A(WN2,p N2) − Ω−
i (WN1,p N1) A(WN2,p N2)
= γi(p) A(WN2,p N2) − Ω−
i (WN1,p N1)( 1− A(WN2,p N2))
= γi(p) A(WN2,p N2) − Ω−
i (WN1,p N1)+Ω−
i (WN1,p N1) A(WN2,p N2).
Substituting we have
Ωi(WN,p N)=Ω+
i (WN1,p N1) A(WN2,p N2)
+ γi(p) A(WN2,p N2)+Ω−
i (WN1,p N1) A(WN2,p N2))
= Ωi(WN1,p N1) A(WN2,p N2)+γi(p) A(WN2,p N2).
20Then, as A(WN2,p N2) > 0a n dγi(p)i st h es a m ef o ra l lt h ev o t e r si nt h es a m ec h a m b e r ,
the measure of success does not display the bicameral paradox.
Thus, this simple result provides a clear cut class of examples of bicameral situations
(wider for decisiveness) in which the bicameral paradox does not occur for success or for
decisiveness10. In particular, the Banzhaf index does not display the paradox, because it
gives the decisiveness of voters when every voter independently votes ’yes’ with probability
1/2. Not surprisingly, the Shapley-Shubik index, for which the independence condition
does not hold, displays the bicameral paradox as is well known. As to real-world bi-
cameral situations, the voting behavior in both chambers is not usually independent and
occurrences of the bicameral paradox are not surprising.
5 Conclusion
We have tested ’against each other’ some of the best known voting power postulates and
paradoxes, and the general measures of success and decisiveness introduced in Laruelle
and Valenciano (2003b). Table 1 summarizes the result of the test.
Paradox\MEASURE DECISIVENESS SUCCESS
Dominance Not if p(S)d e p .o ns Not if p(S)d e p .o ns




Behavioral Quarrel May occur Never
Behavioral Bloc May occur Never
Bicameral Not if independence Not if indep. & γi = γj all i,j
Table 1: Testing the measures of success and decisiveness
In summary we consider worth remarking the following facts: (i) Some paradoxes (do-
nation, bloc and quarrel) never occur neither for the measure of decisiveness nor for the
measure of success. (ii) The measure of success behaves better than that of decisiveness
for the ’behavioral’ versions of the bloc and quarrel paradoxes (as well as for the prefer-
ence for blocker paradox). (iii) A condition of symmetry on the probability distribution
(probability dependent exclusively on the number of ’yes’ voters) is enough to avoid some
’paradoxes’ (dominance and preference for blocker). (iv) Only for the bicameral postulate
10Under the same assumptions, decisiveness will never display the weak bicameral paradox alluded to in
footnote (8), while success may display it.
21decisiveness does better than success: the independence of behavior of the two chambers
is enough to prevent the paradox to occur for the measure of decisiveness.
These results are even more remarkable taking into account that the postulates on
which these paradoxes are based were thought for ’a priori’ measures of power that dis-
regard any information about the voters’ behavior. As a result this test yields some
conclusions about the factual measures considered here and some conclusions concerning
the paradoxes/postulates.
A general conclusion concerning the factual measures of success and decisiveness is
that their conceptual coherence challenges these so-called paradoxes. In all cases in which
a ’paradox’ may occur, the situation can be explained in clear and simple terms consistent
with real-world experience, so that the paradoxes dissipate as such. A side result of this
analysis is to underline the diﬀerence of behavior between the measures of success and
decisiveness. This diﬀerence in behavior permits to stress the distinction of these two
notions, a fact that has perhaps been overlooked in the literature (for an exception see
Barry (1980)). In our view too little attention has been paid to the measure of success,
possibly more important than decisiveness from the point of view of the voters.
As to the postulates whose violation give rise to the paradoxes considered here, this
test yields also some conclusions. The ample variety of ’indices’ (in a general sense, i.e.,
maps φ : VRN → Rn)11, even with completely diﬀerent meaning (measures of success or
decisiveness, factual or a priori), which satisfy each of these postulates, provides twofold
conclusions, which are the two faces of a same fact: (i) On the one hand, the ’solidity’o f
the postulates in general: they are not totally arbitrary requirements. (ii) On the other
hand, the weakness of these postulates which is at the base of this solidity: they are very
little demanding. Thus, although they were thought for a priori measures of power, it
turns out that the measures of factual power (even of factual success) meet them always
or in many cases. As a consequence, their lack of ﬁltering or selecting power is the most
obvious conclusion: only the bicameral postulate has some discriminating power in favor
of decisiveness and beyond semivalues. The reformulation of these paradoxes/postulates
11Recall that for each p, Ω(−,p)a n dΦ(−,p)a r et w os u c hm a p s ,a n dw h e np is symmetric Φ(−,p)i s
a semivalue, which satisfy all postulates but the bicameral one. Still Saari and Sieberg (2000) present as
paradoxical the fact that diﬀerent semivalues (considered as a general notion of power index) may generate
diﬀerent rankings of the players in the same game. But when considered from the point of view provided
by the model based on two inputs, rule and behavior, only misunderstanding can account for expecting
otherwise. By now it is clear that behavior inﬂuences decisiveness, even for the highly symmetrical kind
of behavior represented by semivalues. In fact it is a long time well-known fact the diﬀerent rankings
provided by the two most popular semivalues, the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices in many cases.
Laruelle and Merlin (2002) obtain similar results, but show that all semivalues rank identically the voters
in any weighted majority rule.
22within our setting has also disclosed some internal diﬃculties in the formulation of some
of them within the traditional setting. The rigidity of a setting in which the voting rule is
the only input on which to found a notion of power, forces the inconsistency of formalizing
as a change of voting rule what, according to the interpretation (perceptible even in the
denomination of some paradoxes in the classical setting: ’donation’, ’bloc’, ’quarrel’),
mean a change of behavior.
Finally, the lack of justiﬁcation to speak of ’paradoxes’ anymore seems a most clear
outcome, beyond the ’deeper insight into the true nature of voting power’ (Felsenthal and
Machover (1998, p. 276)) their discussion helps to gain. Some authors seem to endorse
the use of postulates/paradoxes to select the ’best’ power measure. The problem then is:
among which measures? It seems to us a very dubious (not to say metaphysical) method-
ology that of testing measures of insuﬃciently speciﬁed notions by imposing ’postulates’.
In fact, the results presented in this paper show that such a methodology only apparently
may work when only a few disperse and heterogeneous notions to be found in the literature
under the name of ’power indices’ are submitted to the test. It is our humble opinion that
before hurrying to raise expectations about how the measure of something should behave,
it is only wiser a previous deep understanding and consistent formulation of whatever one
is talking about. In this case ’power’, a notion whose complexity12 is its only obvious
feature.
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